Problems in group theory motivated by cryptography

1. INTRODUCTION

The object of this chapter is to showcase algorithmic problems in group theory motivated by (public key) cryptography.

In the core of most public key cryptographic primitives there is an alleged practical irreversibility of some process, usually referred to as a one-way function with trapdoor, which is a function that is easy to compute in one direction, yet believed to be difficult to compute the inverse function on “most” inputs without special information, called the “trapdoor”. For example, the RSA cryptosystem uses the fact that, while it is not hard to compute the product of two large primes, to factor a very large integer into its prime factors appears to be computationally hard. Another, perhaps even more intuitively obvious, example is that of the function \(f(x) = x^2\). It is rather easy to compute in many reasonable (semi)groups, but the inverse function \(\sqrt{x}\) is much less friendly. This fact is exploited in Rabin’s cryptosystem, with the multiplicative semigroup of \(\mathbb{Z}_n\) (\(n\) composite) as the platform. In both cases though, it is not immediately clear what the trapdoor is. This is typically the most nontrivial part of a cryptographic scheme.

For a rigorous definition of a one-way function we refer the reader to [?]; here we just say that there should be an efficient (which usually means polynomial-time with respect to the complexity of an input) way to compute this function, but no visible (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithm for computing the inverse function on “most” inputs. The meaning of “most” is made more precise in Chapter ?? of the present book.

Before we get to the main subject of this chapter, namely problems in combinatorial and computational group theory motivated by cryptography, we recall historically the first public-key cryptographic scheme, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, to put things in perspective. This is done in Section ??, We note that the platform group for the original Diffie-Hellman protocol was finite cyclic. In Section ??, we show how to convert the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to an encryption scheme, known as the ElGamal cryptosystem.

In the subsequent sections, we showcase various problems about infinite non-abelian groups. Complexity of these problems in particular groups has been used in various cryptographic primitives proposed over the last 20 years or so. We mention up front that a significant shift in paradigm motivated by research in cryptography was moving to search versions of decision problems that had been traditionally considered in combinatorial group theory, see e.g. [?, ?]. In some cases, decision problems were used in cryptographic primitives (see e.g. [?]) but these occasions are quite rare.

The idea of using the complexity of infinite non-abelian groups in cryptography goes back to Wagner and Magyarik [?] who in 1985 devised a public-key protocol based on the unsolvability of the word problem for finitely presented groups (or so they thought). Their protocol now looks somewhat naive, but it was pioneering.
More recently, there has been an increased interest in applications of non-abelian group theory to cryptography initially prompted by the papers [? ,?,?].

We note that a separate question of interest that is outside of the scope of this chapter is what groups can be used as platforms for cryptographic protocols. We refer the reader to the monographs [?], [?], [?] for relevant discussions and examples; here we just mention that finding a suitable platform (semi)group for one or another cryptographic primitive is a challenging problem. This is currently an active area of research; here we can mention that groups that have been considered in this context include braid groups (more generally, Artin groups), Thompson’s group, Grigorchuk’s group, small cancellation groups, polycyclic groups, (free) metabelian groups, various groups of matrices, semidirect products, etc.

Here is the list of algorithmic problems that we discuss in this chapter. In most cases, we consider search versions of the problems as more relevant to cryptography, but there are notable exceptions.

– The word (decision) problem: Section ??
– The conjugacy problem: Section ??
– The twisted conjugacy problem: Section ??
– The decomposition problem: Section ??
– The subgroup intersection problem: Section ??
– The factorization problem: Section ??
– The subgroup membership problem: Sections ??, ??
– The isomorphism inversion problem: Section ??
– The subset sum and the knapsack problems: Section ??
– The Post correspondence problem: Section ??
– The hidden subgroup problem: Section ??

Also, in Section ?? we show that using semidirect products of (semi)groups as platforms for a Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol yields various peculiar computational assumptions and, accordingly, peculiar search problems.

In the concluding Section ??, we describe relations between some of the problems discussed in this chapter.

2. THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL

The whole area of public-key cryptography started with the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman [?]. We quote from Wikipedia: “Diffie-Hellman key agreement was invented in 1976 . . . and was the first practical method for establishing a shared secret over an unprotected communications channel.” In 2002 [?], Martin Hellman gave credit to Merkle as well: “The system . . . has since become known as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. While that system was first described in a paper by Diffie and me, it is a public-key distribution system, a concept developed by Merkle, and hence should be called ‘Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange’ if names are to be associated with it. I hope this small pulpit might help in that endeavor to recognize Merkle’s equal contribution to the invention of public-key cryptography.”
U. S. Patent 4,200,770, now expired, describes the algorithm, and credits Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle as inventors.

The simplest, and original, implementation of the protocol uses the multiplicative group $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ of integers modulo $p$, where $p$ is prime and $g$ is primitive mod $p$. A more general description of the protocol uses an arbitrary finite cyclic group.

1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group $G$ and a generating element $g$ in $G$. We will write the group $G$ multiplicatively.
2. Alice picks a random natural number $a$ and sends $g^a$ to Bob.
3. Bob picks a random natural number $b$ and sends $g^b$ to Alice.
4. Alice computes $K_A = (g^b)^a = g^{ba}$.
5. Bob computes $K_B = (g^a)^b = g^{ab}$.

Since $ab = ba$ (because $\mathbb{Z}$ is commutative), both Alice and Bob are now in possession of the same group element $K = K_A = K_B$ which can serve as the shared secret key.

The protocol is considered secure against eavesdroppers if $G$ and $g$ are chosen properly. The eavesdropper, Eve, must solve the Diffie-Hellman problem (recover $g^{ab}$ from $g^a$ and $g^b$) to obtain the shared secret key. This is currently considered difficult for a “good” choice of parameters (see e.g. [?] for details).

An efficient algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem (i.e., recovering $a$ from $g$ and $g^a$) would obviously solve the Diffie-Hellman problem, making this and many other public-key cryptosystems insecure. However, it is not known whether or not the discrete logarithm problem is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem.

We note that there is a “brute force” method for solving the discrete logarithm problem: the eavesdropper Eve can just go over natural numbers $n$ from 1 up one at a time, compute $g^n$ and see whether she has a match with the transmitted element. This will require $O(|g|)$ multiplications, where $|g|$ is the order of $g$. Since in practical implementations $|g|$ is typically at least $10^{300}$, this method is considered computationally infeasible.

This raises a question of computational efficiency for legitimate parties: on the surface, it looks like legitimate parties, too, have to perform $O(|g|)$ multiplications to compute $g^a$ or $g^b$. However, there is a faster way to compute $g^a$ for a particular $a$ by using the “square-and-multiply” algorithm, based on the binary form of $a$. For example, $g^{22} = (((g^2)^2)^2)^2 \cdot (g^2)^2 \cdot g^2$. Thus, to compute $g^a$, one actually needs $O(\log_2 a)$ multiplications, which is feasible given the magnitude of $a$.

2.1. The ElGamal cryptosystem. The ElGamal cryptosystem [?] is a public-key cryptosystem which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The ElGamal protocol is used in the free GNU Privacy Guard software, recent versions of PGP, and other cryptosystems. The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme, which should not be confused with the ElGamal encryption protocol that we describe below.

1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group $G$ and a generating element $g$ in $G$.
2. Alice (the receiver) picks a random natural number $a$ and publishes $c = g^a$. 

---

The ElGamal cryptosystem [?] is a public-key cryptosystem which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The ElGamal protocol is used in the free GNU Privacy Guard software, recent versions of PGP, and other cryptosystems. The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme, which should not be confused with the ElGamal encryption protocol that we describe below.

1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group $G$ and a generating element $g$ in $G$.
2. Alice (the receiver) picks a random natural number $a$ and publishes $c = g^a$. 

(3) Bob (the sender), who wants to send a message $m \in G$ (called a “plaintext” in cryptographic lingo) to Alice, picks a random natural number $b$ and sends two elements, $m \cdot c^b$ and $g^b$, to Alice. Note that $c^b = g^{ab}$.

(4) Alice recovers $m = (m \cdot c^b) \cdot ((g^b)^a)^{-1}$.

A notable feature of the ElGamal encryption is that it is probabilistic, meaning that a single plaintext can be encrypted to many possible ciphertexts.

We also point out that the ElGamal encryption has an average expansion factor of 2, meaning that the ciphertext is about twice as large as the corresponding plaintext.

3. THE CONJUGACY PROBLEM

Let $G$ be a group with solvable word problem. For $w, a \in G$, the notation $w^a$ stands for $a^{-1}wa$. Recall that the conjugacy problem (or conjugacy decision problem) for $G$ is: given two elements $u, v \in G$, find out whether there is $x \in G$ such that $u^x = v$. On the other hand, the conjugacy search problem (sometimes also called the conjugacy witness problem) is: given two elements $a, b \in G$ and the information that $u^x = v$ for some $x \in G$, find at least one particular element $x$ like that.

The conjugacy decision problem is of great interest in group theory. In contrast, the conjugacy search problem is of interest in complexity theory, but of little interest in group theory. Indeed, if you know that $u$ is conjugate to $v$, you can just go over words of the form $u^x$ and compare them to $v$ one at a time, until you get a match. (We implicitly use here an obvious fact that a group with solvable conjugacy problem also has solvable word problem.) This straightforward algorithm is at least exponential-time in the length of $v$, and therefore is considered infeasible for practical purposes.

Thus, if no other algorithm is known for the conjugacy search problem in a group $G$, it is not unreasonable to claim that $x \rightarrow u^x$ is a one-way function and try to build a (public-key) cryptographic protocol on that. In other words, the assumption here would be that in some groups $G$, the following problem is computationally hard: given two elements $a, b$ of $G$ and the information that $a^x = b$ for some $x \in G$, find at least one particular element $x$ like that. The (alleged) computational hardness of this problem in some particular groups (namely, in braid groups) has been used in several group based cryptosystems, most notably in [?] and [?]. However, after some initial excitement (which has even resulted in naming a new area of “braid group cryptography”, see e.g. [?]), it seems now that the conjugacy search problem in a braid group may not provide sufficient level of security; see e.g. [?, ?, ?] for various attacks.

We start with a simple key exchange protocol, due to Ko, Lee et al. [?], which is modeled on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, see Section ??.

(1) An element $w \in G$ is published.
(2) Alice picks a private $a \in G$ and sends $w^a$ to Bob.
(3) Bob picks a private $b \in G$ and sends $w^b$ to Alice.
(4) Alice computes $K_A = (w^b)^a = w^{ba}$, and Bob computes $K_B = (w^a)^b = w^{ab}$. 
If $a$ and $b$ are chosen from a pool of commuting elements of the group $G$, then $ab = ba$, and therefore, Alice and Bob get a common private key $K_B = w^{ab} = w^{ba} = K_A$. Typically, there are two public subgroups $A$ and $B$ of the group $G$, given by their (finite) generating sets, such that $ab = ba$ for any $a \in A, b \in B$.

In the paper [?], the platform group $G$ was the braid group $B_n$, which has some natural commuting subgroups. Selecting a suitable platform group for the above protocol is a very nontrivial matter; some requirements on such a group were put forward in [?]:

(P0) The conjugacy (search) problem in the platform group either has to be well studied or can be reduced to a well-known problem (perhaps, in some other area of mathematics).

(P1) The word problem in $G$ should have a fast (at most quadratic-time) solution by a deterministic algorithm. Better yet, there should be an efficiently computable “normal form” for elements of $G$.

This is required for an efficient common key extraction by legitimate parties in a key establishment protocol, or for the verification step in an authentication protocol, etc.

(P2) The conjugacy search problem should not have an efficient solution by a deterministic algorithm.

We point out here that proving a group to have (P2) should be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The property (P2) should therefore be considered in conjunction with (P0), i.e., the only realistic evidence of a group $G$ having the property (P2) can be the fact that sufficiently many people have been studying the conjugacy (search) problem in $G$ over a sufficiently long time.

The next property is somewhat informal, but it is of great importance for practical implementations:

(P3) There should be a way to disguise elements of $G$ so that it would be impossible to recover $x$ from $x^{-1}wx$ just by inspection.

One way to achieve this is to have a normal form for elements of $G$, which usually means that there is an algorithm that transforms any input $u_{in}$, which is a word in the generators of $G$, to an output $u_{out}$, which is another word in the generators of $G$, such that $u_{in} = u_{out}$ in the group $G$, but this is hard to detect by inspection.

In the absence of a normal form, say if $G$ is just given by means of generators and relators without any additional information about properties of $G$, then at least some of these relators should be very short to be used in a disguising procedure.

To this one can add that the platform group should not have a linear representation of a small dimension since otherwise, a linear algebra attack might be feasible.

3.1. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange protocol. In this section, we are going to describe a key establishment protocol from [?] that really stands out because, unlike other protocols based on the (alleged) hardness of the conjugacy search problem, it does not employ any commuting or commutative subgroups of
a given platform group and can, in fact, use any non-abelian group with efficiently solvable word problem as the platform. This really makes a difference and gives a big advantage to the protocol of [?] over most protocols in this chapter. The choice of the platform group \( G \) for this protocol is a delicate matter though. In the original paper [?], a braid group was suggested as the platform, but with this platform the protocol was subsequently attacked in several different ways, see e.g. [?], [?], [?], [?], [?], [?], [?]. The search for a good platform group for this protocol still continues.

Now we give a description of the AAG protocol. A group \( G \) and elements \( a_1, \ldots, a_k, b_1, \ldots, b_m \in G \) are public.

1. Alice picks a private \( x \in G \) as a word in \( a_1, \ldots, a_k \) (i.e., \( x = x(a_1, \ldots, a_k) \)) and sends \( b_1^x, \ldots, b_m^x \) to Bob.
2. Bob picks a private \( y \in G \) as a word in \( b_1, \ldots, b_m \) and sends \( \alpha_1^y, \ldots, \alpha_k^y \) to Alice.
3. Alice computes \( x(\alpha_1^y, \ldots, \alpha_k^y) = x' = y^{-1}xy \), and Bob computes \( y(b_1^x, \ldots, b_m^x) = \gamma = x'^{-1}yx \). Alice and Bob then come up with a common word \( K = x^{-1}y^{-1}xy \) (called the Commutator \( \text{commutator} \) of \( x \) and \( y \)) as follows: Alice multiplies \( y^{-1}xy \) by \( x^{-1} \) on the left, while Bob multiplies \( x^{-1}yx \) by \( y^{-1} \) on the left, and then takes the inverse of the whole thing: \( (y^{-1}x^{-1}yx)^{-1} = x^{-1}y^{-1}xy \).

It may seem that solving the (simultaneous) conjugacy search problem for \( b_1^x, \ldots, b_m^x; \alpha_1^y, \ldots, \alpha_k^y \) in the group \( G \) would allow an adversary to get the secret key \( K \). However, if we look at Step (3) of the protocol, we see that the adversary would have to know either \( x \) or \( y \) not simply as a word in the generators of the group \( G \), but as a word in \( a_1, \ldots, a_k \) (respectively, as a word in \( b_1, \ldots, b_m \)); otherwise, he would not be able to compose, say, \( x' \) out of \( \alpha_1^y, \ldots, \alpha_k^y \). That means the adversary would also have to solve the membership search problem:

Given elements \( x, a_1, \ldots, a_k \) of a group \( G \), find an expression (if it exists) of \( x \) as a word in \( a_1, \ldots, a_k \).

We note that the membership decision problem is to determine whether or not a given \( x \in G \) belongs to the subgroup of \( G \) generated by \( a_1, \ldots, a_k \). This problem turns out to be quite hard in many groups. For instance, the membership decision problem in a braid group \( B_n \) is algorithmically unsolvable if \( n \geq 6 \) because such a braid group contains subgroups isomorphic to \( F_2 \times F_2 \) (that would be, for example, the subgroup generated by \( 1/2, 2, \frac{2}{3}, \frac{2}{5} \), see [?]), where \( F_2 \) is the free group of rank 2. In the group \( F_2 \times F_2 \), the membership decision problem is algorithmically unsolvable by an old result of Mihailova [?].

We also note that if the adversary finds, say, some \( x' \in G \) such that \( b_1^z = b_1^x \), \( b_2^z = b_2^x \), there is no guarantee that \( x' = x \) in \( G \). Indeed, if \( x' = c_bx \), where \( c_b \) centralizes \( b_i \), then \( b_1^z = b_1^x \) for all \( i \) (in which case we say that \( c_b \) centralizes \( b_1 \)), then \( b_1^z = b_1^x \) for all \( i \), and therefore \( b^z = b^x \) for any element \( b \) from the subgroup generated by \( b_1, \ldots, b_m \); in particular, \( y^z = y^x \). Now the problem is that if \( x' \) (and, similarly, \( y' \)) does not belong to the subgroup \( A \) generated by \( a_1, \ldots, a_k \) (respectively, to the
subgroup $B$ generated by $b_1, \ldots, b_m$, then the adversary may not obtain the correct common secret key $K$. On the other hand, if $x'$ (and, similarly, $y'$) does belong to the subgroup $A$ (respectively, to the subgroup $B$), then the adversary will be able to get the correct $K$ even though his $x'$ and $y'$ may be different from $x$ and $y$, respectively. Indeed, if $x' = c_b x$, $y' = c_a y$, where $c_b$ centralizes $B$ and $c_a$ centralizes $A$ (elementwise), then

$$(x')^{-1} (y')^{-1} x'y' = (c_b x)^{-1} (c_a y)^{-1} c_b x c_a y = x^{-1} c_b^{-1} y^{-1} c_a^{-1} c_b x c_a y = x^{-1} y^{-1} xy = K$$

because $c_b$ commutes with $y$ and with $c_a$ (note that $c_a$ belongs to the subgroup $B$, which follows from the assumption $y' = c_a y \in B$, and, similarly, $c_b$ belongs to $A$), and $c_a$ commutes with $x$.

We emphasize that the adversary ends up with the correct key $K$ (i.e., $K = (x')^{-1} (y')^{-1} x'y' = x^{-1} y^{-1} xy$) if and only if $c_b$ commutes with $c_a$. The only visible way to ensure this is to have $x' \in A$ and $y' \in B$. Without verifying at least one of these inclusions, there seems to be no way for the adversary to make sure that he got the correct key.

Therefore, it appears that if the adversary chooses to solve the conjugacy search problem in the group $G$ to recover $x$ and $y$, he will then have to face either the membership search problem or the membership decision problem; the latter may very well be algorithmically unsolvable in a given group. The bottom line is that the adversary should actually be solving a (probably) more difficult (“subgroup-restricted”) version of the conjugacy search problem:

Given a group $G$, a subgroup $A \leq G$, and two elements $g, h \in G$,
find $x \in A$ such that $h = x^{-1} gx$, given that at least one such $x$ exists.

3.2. The twisted conjugacy problem. Let $\phi, \psi$ be two fixed automorphisms (more generally, endomorphisms) of a group $G$. Two elements $u, v \in G$ are called $(\phi, \psi)$-double-twisted conjugate if there is an element $w \in G$ such that $w^\phi u = w^\psi v$.

When $\phi = \psi = id$, then $u$ and $v$ are called -twisted conjugate, while in the case $\phi = \psi = id$, $u$ and $v$ are just usual conjugates of each other.

The twisted (or double twisted) conjugacy problem in $G$ is:

decide whether or not two given elements $u, v \in G$ are twisted (double twisted) conjugate in $G$ for a fixed pair of endomorphisms $
$, of the group $G$.

Note that if $\phi$ is an automorphism, then $(\phi, \psi)$-double-twisted conjugacy problem reduces to $\phi^{-1}$-twisted conjugacy problem, so in this case it is sufficient to consider just the twisted conjugacy problem. This problem was studied from the group-theoretic perspective, see e.g. [?, ?, ?], and in [?] it was used in an authentication protocol. It is interesting that the research in [?, ?] was probably motivated by cryptographic applications, while the authors of [?] arrived at the twisted conjugacy problem motivated by problems in topology.

4. The decomposition problem

Another ramification of the conjugacy search problem is the following decomposition search problem:
Given two elements \( w \) and \( w' \) of a group \( G \), find two elements \( x \in A \) and \( y \in B \) that would belong to given subsets (usually subgroups) \( A, B \subseteq G \) and satisfy \( x \cdot w \cdot y = w' \), provided at least one such pair of elements exists.

We note that if in the above problem \( A = B \) is a subgroup, then this problem is also known as the double coset problem.

We also note that some \( x \) and \( y \) satisfying the equality \( x \cdot w \cdot y = w' \) always exist (e.g. \( x = 1, y = w^{-1}w' \)), so the point is to have them satisfy the conditions \( x \in A \) and \( y \in B \). We therefore will not usually refer to this problem as a subgroup-restricted decomposition search problem because it is always going to be subgroup-restricted; otherwise it does not make much sense. We also note that the most commonly considered special case of the decomposition search problem so far is where \( A = B \).

We are going to show in Section ?? that solving the conjugacy search problem is unnecessary for an adversary to get the common secret key in the Ko-Lee (or any similar) protocol (see our Section ??); it is sufficient to solve a seemingly easier decomposition search problem. This was mentioned, in passing, in the paper [?], but the significance of this observation was downplayed there.

We note that the membership condition \( x, y \in A \) may not be easy to verify for some subsets \( A \). The authors of [?] do not address this problem; instead they mention, in justice, that if one uses a “brute force” attack by simply going over elements of \( A \) one at a time, the above condition will be satisfied automatically. This however may not be the case with other, more practical, attacks.

We also note that the conjugacy search problem is a special case of the decomposition problem where \( w' \) is conjugate to \( w \) and \( x = y^{-1} \). The claim that the decomposition problem should be easier than the conjugacy search problem is intuitively clear since it is generally easier to solve an equation with two unknowns than a special case of the same equation with just one unknown. We admit however that there might be exceptions to this general rule.

Now we give a formal description of a typical protocol based on the decomposition problem. There is a public group \( G \), a public element \( w \in G \), and two public subgroups \( A, B \subseteq G \) commuting elementwise, i.e., \( ab = ba \) for any \( a \in A, b \in B \).

(1) Alice randomly selects private elements \( a_1, a_2 \in A \). Then she sends the element \( a_1wa_2 \) to Bob.

(2) Bob randomly selects private elements \( b_1, b_2 \in B \). Then he sends the element \( b_1wb_2 \) to Alice.

(3) Alice computes \( K_A = a_1b_1wb_2a_2 \), and Bob computes \( K_B = b_2a_1wb_1a_2 \).

Since \( a_ib_i = b_ia_i \) in \( G \), one has \( K_A = K_B = K \) (as an element of \( G \)), which is now Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.

We now discuss several modifications of the above protocol.

4.1. “Twisted” protocol. This idea is due to Shpilrain and Ushakov [?]; the following modification of the above protocol appears to be more secure (at least for some choices of the platform group) against so-called “length based” attacks (see e.g. [?], [?], [?]), according to computer experiments. Again, there is a public group \( G \) and two public subgroups \( A, B \subseteq G \) commuting elementwise.
(1) Alice randomly selects private elements \(a_1 \in A\) and \(b_1 \in B\). Then she sends the element \(a_1w_1b_1\) to Bob.
(2) Bob randomly selects private elements \(b_2 \in B\) and \(a_2 \in A\). Then he sends the element \(b_2wa_2\) to Alice.
(3) Alice computes \(K_A = a_1b_2wa_2b_1 = b_2a_1wb_1a_2\), and Bob computes \(K_B = b_2a_1wb_1a_2\). Since \(a_1b_1 = b_1a_1\) in \(G\), one has \(K_A = K_B = K\) (as an element of \(G\)), which is now Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.

4.2. Finding intersection of given subgroups. Another modification of the protocol in Section ?? is also due to Shpilrain and Ushakov [7]. First we give a sketch of the idea.

Let \(G\) be a group and \(g \in G\). Denote by \(C_G(g)\) the centralizer of \(g\) in \(G\), i.e., the set of elements \(h \in G\) such that \(hg = gh\). For \(S = \{g_1, \ldots, g_k\} \subseteq G\), \(C_G(g_1, \ldots, g_k)\) denotes the centralizer of \(S\) in \(G\), which is the intersection of the centralizers \(C_G(g_i), i = 1, \ldots, k\).

Now, given a public \(w \in G\), Alice privately selects \(a_1 \in G\) and publishes a subgroup \(B \subseteq C_G(a_1)\) (we tacitly assume here that \(B\) can be computed efficiently). Similarly, Bob privately selects \(b_2 \in G\) and publishes a subgroup \(A \subseteq C_G(b_2)\). Alice then selects \(a_2 \in A\) and sends \(w_1 = a_1wa_2\) to Bob, while Bob selects \(b_1 \in B\) and sends \(w_2 = b_1wb_2\) to Alice.

Thus, in the first transmission, say, the adversary faces the problem of finding \(a_1, a_2\) such that \(w_1 = a_1wa_2\), where \(a_2 \in A\), but there is no explicit indication of where to choose \(a_1\) from. Therefore, before arranging something like a length based attack in this case, the adversary would have to compute generators of the centralizer \(C_G(B)\) first (because \(a_1 \in C_G(B)\)), which is usually a hard problem by itself since it basically amounts to finding the intersection of the centralizers of individual elements, and finding (the generators of) the intersection of subgroups is a notoriously difficult problem for most groups considered in combinatorial group theory.

Now we give a formal description of the protocol from [7]. As usual, there is a public group \(G\), and let \(w \in G\) be public, too.

(1) Alice chooses an element \(a_1 \in G\), chooses a subgroup of \(C_G(a_1)\), and publishes its generators \(A = \{1, \ldots, k\}\).
(2) Bob chooses an element \(b_2 \in G\), chooses a subgroup of \(C_G(b_2)\), and publishes its generators \(B = \{1, \ldots, m\}\).
(3) Alice chooses a random element \(a_2\) from \(gp < 1, \ldots, m\rangle\) and sends \(P_A = a_1wa_2\) to Bob.
(4) Bob chooses a random element \(b_1\) from \(gp < 1, \ldots, k\rangle\) and sends \(P_B = b_1wb_2\) to Alice.
(5) Alice computes \(K_A = a_1P_Ba_2\).
(6) Bob computes \(K_B = b_1P_Ab_2\).

Since \(a_1b_1 = b_1a_1\) and \(a_2b_2 = b_2a_2\), we have \(K = K_A = K_B\), the shared secret key.
We note that in [?], an attack on this protocol was offered (in the case where a braid group is used as the platform), using what the author calls the *linear centralizer method*. Then, in [?], another method of cryptanalysis (called the *algebraic span cryptanalysis*) was offered, applicable to platform groups that admit an efficient linear representation. This method yields attacks on various protocols, including the one in this section, if a braid group is used as the platform.

4.3. **Commutative subgroups.** Instead of using *commuting* subgroups $A, B \leq G$, one can use *commutative* subgroups. Thus, suppose $A, B \leq G$ are two public commutative subgroups (or subsemigroups) of a group $G$, and let $w \in G$ be a public element.

(1) Alice randomly selects private elements $a_1 \in A$, $b_1 \in B$. Then she sends the element $a_1wb_1$ to Bob.

(2) Bob randomly selects private elements $a_2 \in A$, $b_2 \in B$. Then he sends the element $a_2wb_2$ to Alice.

(3) Alice computes $K_A = a_1a_2wb_1b_1$, and Bob computes $K_B = a_2a_1wb_1b_2$.

Since $a_1a_2 = a_2a_1$ and $b_1b_2 = b_2b_1$ in $G$, one has $K_A = K_B = K$ (as an element of $G$), which is now Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.

4.4. **The factorization problem.** The *factorization search problem* is a special case of the decomposition search problem:

Given an element $w$ of a group $G$ and two subgroups $A, B \leq G$, find any two elements $a \in A$ and $b \in B$ that would satisfy $a \cdot b = w$, provided at least one such pair of elements exists.

The following protocol relies in its security on the computational hardness of the factorization search problem. As before, there is a public group $G$, and two public subgroups $A, B \leq G$ commuting elementwise, i.e., $ab = ba$ for any $a \in A, b \in B$.

(1) Alice randomly selects private elements $a_1 \in A$, $b_1 \in B$. Then she sends the element $a_1b_1$ to Bob.

(2) Bob randomly selects private elements $a_2 \in A$, $b_2 \in B$. Then he sends the element $a_2b_2$ to Alice.

(3) Alice computes

$$K_A = b_1(a_2b_2)a_1 = a_2b_1a_1b_2 = a_2a_1b_1b_2,$$

and Bob computes

$$K_B = a_2(a_1b_1)b_2 = a_2a_1b_1b_2.$$

Thus, $K_A = K_B = K$ is now Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.

We note that the adversary, Eve, who knows the elements $a_1b_1$ and $a_2b_2$, can compute $(a_1b_1)(a_2b_2) = a_1b_1a_2b_2 = a_1a_2b_1b_2$ and $(a_2b_2)(a_1b_1) = a_2a_1b_2b_1$, but neither of these products is equal to $K$ if $a_1a_2 \neq a_2a_1$ and $b_1b_2 \neq b_2b_1$.

Finally, we point out a *decision* factorization problem:

Given an element $w$ of a group $G$ and two subgroups $A, B \leq G$, find out whether or not there are two elements $a \in A$ and $b \in B$ such that $w = a \cdot b$. 
This seems to be a new and non-trivial algorithmic problem in group theory, motivated by cryptography.

5. The Word Problem

The word problem “needs no introduction”, but it probably makes sense to spell out the word search problem:

Suppose $H$ is a group given by a finite presentation $< X; R >$ and let $F(X)$ be the free group with the set $X$ of free generators. Given a group word $w$ in the alphabet $X$, find a sequence of conjugates of elements from $R$ whose product is equal to $w$ in the free group $F(X)$.

Long time ago, there was an attempt to use the undecidability of the decision word problem (in some groups) in public key cryptography [?]. This was, in fact, historically the first attempt to employ a hard algorithmic problem from combinatorial group theory in public key cryptography. However, as was pointed out in [?], the problem that is actually used in [?] is not the word problem, but the word choice problem: given $g, w_1, w_2 \in G$, find out whether $g = w_1$ or $g = w_2$ in $G$, provided one of the two equalities holds. In this problem, both parts are recursively solvable for any recursively presented platform group $G$ because they both are the “yes” parts of the word problem. Therefore, undecidability of the actual word problem in the platform group has no bearing on the security of the encryption scheme in [?].

On the other hand, employing decision problems (as opposed to search problems) in public-key cryptography would allow one to depart from the canonical paradigm and construct cryptographic protocols with new properties, impossible in the canonical model. In particular, such protocols can be secure against some “brute force” attacks by a computationally unbounded adversary. There is a price to pay for that, but the price is reasonable: a legitimate receiver decrypts correctly with probability that can be made very close to 1, but not equal to 1. This idea was implemented in [?], so the exposition below follows that paper.

We assume that the sender (Bob) is given a presentation $\Gamma$ (published by the receiver Alice) of a group $G$ by generators and defining relators:

$$\Gamma = \langle x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \mid r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle.$$ 

No further information about the group $G$ is available to Bob.

Bob is instructed to transmit his private bit to Alice by transmitting a word $u = u(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ equal to 1 in $G$ in place of “1” and a word $v = v(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ not equal to 1 in $G$ in place of “0”.

Now we have to specify the algorithms that Bob should use to select his words.

Algorithm “0” (for selecting a word $v = v(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ not equal to 1 in $G$) is quite simple: Bob just selects a random word by building it letter-by-letter, selecting each letter uniformly from the set $X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n, x_1^{-1}, \ldots, x_n^{-1}\}$. The length of such a word should be a random integer from an interval that Bob selects up front, based on his computational abilities.
Algorithm “1” (for selecting a word \(u = u(x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) equal to 1 in \(G\)) is slightly more complex. It amounts to applying a random sequence of operations of the following two kinds, starting with the empty word:

1. Inserting into a random place in the current word a pair \(hh^{-1}\) for a random word \(h\).
2. Inserting into a random place in the current word a random conjugate \(g^{-1}r_ig\) of a random defining relator \(r_i\).

The length of the resulting word should be in the same range as the length of the output of Algorithm “0”, for indistinguishability.

5.1. Encryption emulation attack. Now let us see what happens if a computationally unbounded adversary uses what is called encryption emulation attack on Bob’s encryption. This kind of attack always succeeds against “traditional” encryption protocols where the receiver decrypts correctly with probability exactly 1.

The encryption emulation attack is:

For either bit, generate its encryption over and over again, each time with fresh randomness, until the ciphertext to be attacked is obtained. Then the corresponding plaintext is the bit that was encrypted.

Thus, the (computationally unbounded) adversary is building up two lists, corresponding to two algorithms above. Our first observation is that the list that corresponds to the Algorithm “0” is useless to the adversary because it is eventually going to contain all words in the alphabet \(X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n, x_1^{-1}, \ldots, x_n^{-1}\}\). Therefore, the adversary may just as well forget about this list and focus on the other one, that corresponds to the Algorithm “1”.

Now the situation boils down to the following: if a word \(w\) transmitted by Bob appears on the list, then it is equal to 1 in \(G\). If not, then not. The only problem is: how can one conclude that \(w\) does not appear on the list if the list is infinite? Of course, there is no infinity in real life, so the list is actually finite because of Bob’s computational limitations. Still, at least in theory, the adversary does not know a bound on the size of the list if she does not know Bob’s computational limits.

Then, perhaps the adversary can stop at some point and conclude that \(w \neq 1\) with overwhelming probability, just like Alice does? The point however is that this probability may not at all be as “overwhelming” as the probability of the correct decryption by Alice. Compare:

1. For Alice to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the probability \(P_1(N)\) for a random word \(w\) of length \(N\) not to be equal to 1 should converge to 1 (reasonably fast) as \(N\) goes to infinity.
2. For the adversary to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the probability \(P_2(N, f(N))\) for a random word \(w\) of length \(N\) produced by the Algorithm “1” to have a proof of length \(\leq f(N)\) verifying that \(w = 1\), should converge to 1 as \(N\) goes to infinity. Here \(f(N)\) represents the adversary’s computational capabilities; this function can be arbitrary, but fixed.
We see that the functions $P_1(N)$ and $P_2(N)$ are of very different nature, and any correlation between them is unlikely. We note that the function $P_1(N)$ is generally well understood, and in particular, it is known that in any infinite group $G$, $P_1(N)$ indeed converges to 1 as $N$ goes to infinity.

On the other hand, functions $P_2(N, f(N))$ are more complex; note also that they may depend on a particular algorithm used by Bob to produce words equal to 1. The Algorithm “1” described in this section is very straightforward; there are more delicate algorithms discussed in [?].

Functions $P_2(N, f(N))$ are currently subject of active research, and in particular, it appears likely that there are groups in which $P_2(N, f(N))$ does not converge to 1 at all, if an algorithm used to produce words equal to 1 is chosen intelligently.

We also note in passing that if in a group $G$ the word problem is recursively unsolvable, then the length of a proof verifying that $w = 1$ in $G$ is not bounded by any recursive function of the length of $w$.

Of course, in real life, the adversary may know a bound on the size of the list based on a general idea of what kind of hardware may be available to Bob; but then again, in real life the adversary would be computationally bounded, too. Here we note (again, in passing) that there are groups $G$ with efficiently solvable word problem and words $w$ of length $n$ equal to 1 in $G$, such that the length of a proof verifying that $w = 1$ in $G$ is not bounded by any tower of exponents in $n$, see [?].

Thus, the bottom line is: in theory, the adversary cannot positively identify the bit that Bob has encrypted by a word $w$ if she just uses the “encryption emulation” attack. In fact, such an identification would be equivalent to solving the word problem in $G$, which would contradict the well-known fact that there are (finitely presented) groups with recursively unsolvable word problem.

It would be nice, of course, if the adversary was unable to positively decrypt using “encryption emulation” attacks even if she did know Bob’s computational limitations. This, too, can be arranged, see the following subsection.

5.2. **Encryption.** Building on the ideas from the previous subsection and combining them with a simple yet subtle trick, we describe here an encryption protocol from [?] that has the following features:

- **(F1)** Bob encrypts his private bit sequence by a word in a public alphabet $X$.
- **(F2)** Alice (the receiver) decrypts Bob’s transmission correctly with probability that can be made arbitrarily close to 1, but not equal to 1.
- **(F3)** The adversary, Eve, is assumed to have no bound on the speed of computation or on the storage space.
- **(F4)** Eve is assumed to have complete information on the algorithm(s) and hardware that Bob uses for encryption. However, Eve cannot predict outputs of Bob’s random numbers generator.
- **(F5)** Eve cannot decrypt Bob’s bit correctly with probability $> \frac{3}{4}$ by emulating Bob’s encryption algorithm.

This leaves Eve with the only possibility: to attack Alice’s decryption algorithm or her algorithm for obtaining public keys, but this is a different story. Here we only discuss the encryption emulation attack, to make a point that this attack can
be unsuccessful if the probability of the legitimate decryption is close to 1, but not exactly 1.

Here is the relevant protocol (for encrypting a single bit).

(P0) Alice publishes two presentations:

\[ \Gamma_1 = \langle x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \mid r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle \]

\[ \Gamma_2 = \langle x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \mid s_1, s_2, \ldots \rangle. \]

One of them defines the trivial group, whereas the other one defines an infinite group, but only Alice knows which one is which. Bob is instructed to transmit his private bit to Alice as follows:

(P1) In place of “1”, Bob transmits a pair of words \((w_1, w_2)\) in the alphabet \(X = \{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n, x_1^{-1}, \ldots, x_n^{-1}\}\), where \(w_1\) is selected randomly, while \(w_2\) is selected to be equal to 1 in the group \(G_2\) defined by \(\Gamma_2\) (see e.g. Algorithm “1” in the previous section).

(P2) In place of “0”, Bob transmits a pair of words \((w_1, w_2)\), where \(w_2\) is selected randomly, while \(w_1\) is selected to be equal to 1 in the group \(G_1\) defined by \(\Gamma_1\).

Under our assumptions (F3), (F4) Eve can identify the word(s) in the transmitted pair which is/are equal to 1 in the corresponding presentation(s), as well as the word, if any, which is not equal to 1. There are the following possibilities:

1. \(w_1 = 1\) in \(G_1\), \(w_2 = 1\) in \(G_2\);
2. \(w_1 = 1\) in \(G_1\), \(w_2 \neq 1\) in \(G_2\);
3. \(w_1 \neq 1\) in \(G_1\), \(w_2 = 1\) in \(G_2\).

It is easy to see that the possibility (1) occurs with probability \(\frac{1}{2}\) (when Bob wants to transmit “1” and \(G_1\) is trivial, or when Bob wants to transmit “0” and \(G_2\) is trivial). If this possibility occurs, Eve cannot decrypt Bob’s bit correctly with probability \(\frac{1}{2}\). Indeed, the only way for Eve to decrypt in this case would be to find out which presentation \(\Gamma_i\) defines the trivial group, i.e., she would have to attack Alice’s algorithm for obtaining a public key, which would not be part of the encryption emulation attack anymore. Here we just note, in passing, that there are many different ways to construct presentations of the trivial group, some of them involving a lot of random choices. See e.g. [?] for a survey on the subject.

In any case, our claim (F5) was that Eve cannot decrypt Bob’s bit correctly with probability \(\frac{3}{4}\) by emulating Bob’s encryption algorithm, which is obviously true in this scheme since the probability for Eve to decrypt correctly is, in fact, precisely \(\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 = \frac{3}{4}\). (Note that Eve decrypts correctly with probability 1 if either of the possibilities (2) or (3) above occurs.)

6. THE SUBGROUP MEMBERSHIP PROBLEM

In [?], a public-key encryption scheme was offered, where security was based on the alleged computational hardness of the subgroup membership search problem combined with the automorphism inversion problem. A free metabelian group was used as the platform. In this section, we describe a different scheme where
The (notoriously hard) subgroup membership problem in a matrix group over \( \mathbb{Q} \) is employed. In the following Section ??, we offer another public-key encryption scheme whose security is based on the hardness of the subgroup membership decision problem. The latter problem is known to be algorithmically unsolvable in groups \( GL_n(\mathbb{Q}) \) for \( n \geq 4 \), and is not known to be algorithmically solvable for \( n = 2, 3 \).

The protocol in this section is for encrypting elements of a free group \( F(x,y) \) by matrices from \( GL_2(\mathbb{Q}) \). This encryption is homomorphic with respect to group multiplication.

Denote \( A(k) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & k \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \), \( B(k) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ k & 1 \end{pmatrix} \). It is well known that \( A(k) \) and \( B(k) \) generate a free group if \( k \geq 2 \).

6.1. **Private key.** Private key consists of:
- An integer \( k \geq 2 \)
- A matrix \( H \in GL_2(\mathbb{Q}) \)
- A pair \( (u_1 = u_1(x,y), u_2 = u_2(x,y)) \) of elements of a free group \( F(x,y) \) generated by \( x \) and \( y \). The pair \( (u_1, u_2) \) should freely generate a subgroup of \( F(x,y) \).

6.2. **Public key.** Let \( M_1 = H^{-1}A(k)H, M_2 = H^{-1}B(k)H \). Public key is a pair of matrices \( (u_1(M_1,M_2), u_2(M_1,M_2)) \). Denote \( R = u_1(M_1, M_2), S = u_2(M_1, M_2) \).

6.3. **Plaintext.** Plaintexts are elements \( w(x,y) \) of the free group \( F(x,y) \).

6.4. **Encryption.** Encryption of \( w(x,y) \) is the matrix \( w(R, S) \in GL_2(\mathbb{Q}) \).

6.5. **Decryption.** The matrix \( w(R, S) \) is conjugated by \( H^{-1} \) to get: \( Hw(R, S)H^{-1} = w(HRH^{-1}, HSH^{-1}) = w(u_1(A(k), B(k)), u_2(A(k), B(k))) \). Now the latter matrix \( w(u_1(A(k), B(k)), u_2(A(k), B(k))) \) is in the subgroup of \( SL_2(\mathbb{Z}) \) generated by \( u_1(A(k), B(k)) \) and \( u_2(A(k), B(k)) \), and in particular, in the subgroup generated by \( A(k) \) and \( B(k) \). There is an efficient algorithm [?] for representing a given element of this subgroup as a group word in \( A(k) \) and \( B(k) \). However, the plaintext is a group word in \( u_1(A(k), B(k)) \) and \( u_2(A(k), B(k)) \). Thus, one last step in decryption is re-writing an element of a free group generated by \( A(k) \) and \( B(k) \) as a group word in \( u_1(A(k), B(k)) \) and \( u_2(A(k), B(k)) \). This can be done efficiently by using Nielsen’s method [?].

The decryption is unique because the group generated by \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) is free.

6.6. **Security assumption.** The subgroup membership (search) problem in a subgroup of \( SL_2(\mathbb{Q}) \) generated by two given elements is computationally hard. We note that the general subgroup membership (decision) problem in \( SL_2(\mathbb{Q}) \) is open, and therefore there is no known time bound for solving the subgroup membership (search) problem in a random subgroup of \( SL_2(\mathbb{Q}) \).

6.7. **Trapdoor.** Reducing the general subgroup membership (search) problem in \( SL_2(\mathbb{Q}) \) to the subgroup membership (search) problem in the subgroup generated by \( A(k) \) and \( B(k) \), where this problem can be solved efficiently due to [?].
7. USING THE SUBGROUP MEMBERSHIP DECISION PROBLEM

Complexity of decision problems, as opposed to that of search problems, is rarely used in public-key cryptography. A notable exception is [?] (see also our Section ??) where the complexity of the word (decision) problem was used to defeat the encryption emulation attack. Here we use the complexity of the subgroup membership decision problem in groups $GL_n(\mathbb{Q})$ to encrypt a single bit. It is well known that if $n \geq 4$, then the subgroup membership problem in groups $GL_n(\mathbb{Q})$ is unsolvable since these groups contain a subgroup isomorphic to $F_2 \times F_2$, a direct product of two free groups of rank 2. In the latter group, the subgroup membership problem is unsolvable due to [?].

The initial setup is similar to that in our Section ??, except that we will be working in the group $GL_4(\mathbb{Q})$, so in particular, here $A(k) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & k & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$, $B(k) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ k & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$. We require here that $k \geq 3$. The conjugating matrix $H \in GL_4(\mathbb{Q})$. Otherwise, the setup is the same.

7.1. **Encryption.** To encrypt the “1” bit, the sender builds a random group word in the published elements and transmits it to the receiver.

To encrypt the “0” bit, the sender just selects a random matrix from $GL_4(\mathbb{Q})$ and transmits it to the receiver.

7.2. **Decryption.** We are going to use the fact that for a random matrix from $SL_2(\mathbb{Z})$, the probability to belong to the subgroup generated by $A(k)$ and $B(k)$ (in the notation of Section ??) is negligible if $k \geq 3$; this follows from the fact that the latter subgroup has infinite index in $SL_2(\mathbb{Z})$, see [?]. The same is therefore also true for a random matrix from $GL_4(\mathbb{Q})$ and for the subgroup generated by $A(k)$ and $B(k)$ in the notation of this section.

Thus, the receiver applies the procedure from our Section ?? to see whether or not the transmitted matrix belongs to the subgroup generated by public elements. If it does, the secret bit must be “1”, otherwise it must be “0”.

8. THE ISOMORPHISM INVERSION PROBLEM

The isomorphism (decision) problem for groups is very well known: suppose two groups are given by their finite presentations in terms of generators and defining relators, then find out whether the groups are isomorphic. The search version of this problem is well known, too: given two finite presentations defining isomorphic groups, find a particular isomorphism between the groups.

Now the following problem, of interest in cryptography, is not what was previously considered in combinatorial group theory:
Given two finite presentations defining isomorphic groups, $G$ and $H$, and an isomorphism $\phi : G \rightarrow H$, find $\phi^{-1}$.

Now we describe an encryption scheme whose security is based on the alleged computational hardness of the isomorphism inversion problem. Our idea itself is quite simple: encrypt with a public isomorphism that is computationally infeasible for the adversary to invert. A legitimate receiver, on the other hand, can efficiently compute $\phi^{-1}$ because she knows a factorization of the isomorphism in a product of “elementary”, easily invertible, isomorphisms.

What is interesting to note is that this encryption is *homomorphic* because $(g_1g_2) = (g_1)(g_2)$ for any $g_1, g_2 \in G$. The significance of this observation is due to a result of [?]: if the group $G$ is a non-abelian finite simple group, then any homomorphic encryption on $G$ can be converted to a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, i.e., encryption that respects not just one but two operations: either boolean AND and OR or arithmetic addition and multiplication.

In summary, a relevant scheme can be built as follows. Given a public presentation of a group $G$ by generators and defining relations, the receiver (Alice) uses a chain of private “elementary” isomorphisms $G \rightarrow H_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow H_k \rightarrow H$, each of which is easily invertible, but the (public) composite isomorphism $\phi : G \rightarrow H$ is hard to invert without the knowledge of a factorization in a product of “elementary” ones. (Note that $\phi$ is published as a map taking the generators of $G$ to words in the generators of $H$.) Having obtained this way a (private) presentation $H$, Alice discards some of the defining relations to obtain a public presentation $\hat{H}$. Thus, the group $H$, as well as the group $G$ (which is isomorphic to $H$), is a homomorphic image of the group $\hat{H}$. (Note that $\hat{H}$ has the same set of generators as $H$ does but has fewer defining relations.) Now the sender (Bob), who wants to encrypt his plaintext $g \in G$, selects an arbitrary word $w_g$ (in the generators of $G$) representing the element $g$ and applies the public isomorphism $\phi$ to get $\phi(w_g)$, which is a word in the generators of $H$ (or $\hat{H}$, since $H$ and $\hat{H}$ have the same set of generators). He then selects an arbitrary word $h_g$ in the generators of $\hat{H}$ representing the same element of $\hat{H}$ as $\phi(w_g)$ does, and this is now his ciphertext: $E(g) = h_g$. To decrypt, Alice applies her private map $\phi^{-1}$ (which is a map taking the generators of $\hat{H}$ to words in the generators of $G$) to $h_g$ to get a word $\phi^{-1}(h_g)$. This word $\phi^{-1}(h_g)$ represents the same element of $G$ as $w_g$ does because $\phi^{-1}(\phi(w_g)) = w_g$ in the group $G$ since both $\phi$ and $\phi^{-1}$ are homomorphisms, and the composition of them is the identity map on the group $G$, i.e., it takes every word in the generators of $G$ to a word representing the same element of $G$. Thus, Alice decrypts correctly.

We emphasize here that a plaintext is a *group element* $g \in G$, not a word in the generators of $G$. This implies, in particular, that there should be some kind of canonical way (a “normal form”) of representing elements of $G$. For example, for elements of an alternating group $A_m$ (these groups are finite non-abelian simple groups if $m \geq 5$), such a canonical representation can be the standard representation by a permutation of the set $\{1, \ldots, m\}$. 
Now we are going to give more details on how one can construct a sequence of “elementary” isomorphisms starting with a given presentation of a group \( G = \langle x_1, x_2, \ldots | r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle \). (Here \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \) are generators and \( r_1, r_2, \ldots \) are defining relators). These “elementary” isomorphisms are called Tietze transformations. They are universal in the sense that they can be applied to any (semi)group presentation. Tietze transformations are of the following types:

(T1): \textit{Introducing a new generator:} Replace \( \langle x_1, x_2, \ldots | r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle \) by \( \langle y, x_1, x_2, \ldots | y s^{-1}, r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle \), where \( s = s(x_1, x_2, \ldots) \) is an arbitrary element in the generators \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \).

(T2): \textit{Canceling a generator} (this is the converse of (T1)): If we have a presentation of the form \( \langle y, x_1, x_2, \ldots | q, r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle \), where \( q \) is of the form \( y s^{-1} \), and \( s, r_1, r_2, \ldots \) are in the group generated by \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \), replace this presentation by \( \langle x_1, x_2, \ldots | r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle \).

(T3): \textit{Applying an automorphism:} Apply an automorphism of the free group generated by \( x_1, x_2, \ldots \) to all the relators \( r_1, r_2, \ldots \).

(T4): \textit{Changing defining relators:} Replace the set \( r_1, r_2, \ldots \) of defining relators by another set \( r'_1, r'_2, \ldots \) with the same normal closure. That means, each of \( r'_1, r'_2, \ldots \) should belong to the normal subgroup generated by \( r_1, r_2, \ldots \), and vice versa.

Tietze proved (see e.g. [?] that two groups given by presentations \( \langle x_1, x_2, \ldots | r_1, r_2, \ldots \rangle \) and \( \langle y_1, y_2, \ldots | s_1, s_2, \ldots \rangle \) are isomorphic if and only if one can get from one of the presentations to the other by a sequence of transformations (T1)–(T4).

For each Tietze transformation of the types (T1)–(T3), it is easy to obtain an explicit isomorphism (as a map on generators) and its inverse. For a Tietze transformation of the type (T4), the isomorphism is just the identity map. We would like here to make Tietze transformations of the type (T4) recursive, because \textit{a priori} it is not clear how Alice can actually implement these transformations. Thus, Alice can use the following recursive version of (T4):

(T4') In the set \( r_1, r_2, \ldots \), replace some \( r_i \) by one of the: \( r_i^{-1}, r_i r_j, r_i r_j^{-1}, r_j r_i, r_j r_i^{-1}, \)

\( x_k^{-1} r_i x_k, x_i r_k x_k^{-1}, \) where \( j \neq i \), and \( k \) is arbitrary.

One particularly useful feature of Tietze transformations is that they can break long defining relators into short pieces (of length 3 or 4, say) at the expense of introducing more generators, as illustrated by the following simple example. In this example, we start with a presentation having two relators of length 5 in 3 generators, and end up with a presentation having 4 relators of length 3 and one relator of length 4, in 6 generators. The \( \cong \) symbol below means “is isomorphic to.”

\textbf{Example 1.} \( G = \langle x_1, x_2, x_3 | x_1^2 x_2^3, x_1 x_2 x_3^{-1} x_3 \rangle \cong \langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 | x_4 = x_1^2, x_4 x_2^3, x_1 x_2 x_3^{-1} x_3 \rangle \cong \langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 | x_5 = x_1 x_2 x_3, x_4 = x_1^2, x_4 x_3^3, x_5 x_1^{-1} x_3 \rangle \cong (\text{now switching } x_1 \text{ and } x_5 - \text{this is (T3)}) \cong \langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5 | x_1 = x_5 x_2, x_4 = x_3^2, x_4 x_3^2, x_1 x_5^{-1} x_3 \rangle \cong \langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6 | x_1^{-1} x_5 x_2, x_4^{-1} x_3^2, x_6^{-1} x_4 x_2, x_6 x_2, x_1 x_5^{-1} x_3 \rangle = H. \)
We note that this procedure of breaking relators into pieces of length 3 increases the total relator length (measured as the sum of the length of all relators) by at most a factor of 2.

Since we need our “elementary” isomorphisms to be also given in the form \( x_i \rightarrow y_i \), we note that the isomorphism between the first two presentations above is given by \( x_i \rightarrow x_i \), \( i = 1, 2, 3 \), and the inverse isomorphism is given by \( x_i \rightarrow x_i \), \( i = 1, 2, 3 \); \( x_4 \rightarrow x_1^3 \). By composing elementary isomorphisms, we compute the isomorphism between the first and the last presentations: \( x_1 \rightarrow x_5 \), \( x_2 \rightarrow x_2 \), \( x_3 \rightarrow x_3 \), \( x_4 \rightarrow x_1^3 \), \( x_5 \rightarrow x_1 \), \( x_6 \rightarrow x_1^3 x_2 \). We see that even in this toy example, recovering \( ^{-1} \) from the public is not quite trivial without knowing a sequence of intermediate Tietze transformations. Furthermore, if Alice discards, say, two of the relators from the last presentation to get a public \( \hat{H} = \langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6 \mid x_1^{-1} x_5 x_2^3, x_6 x_2^3, x_1 x_5^{-1} x_3 \rangle \), then there is no isomorphism between \( \hat{H} \) and \( G \) whatsoever, and the problem for the adversary is now even less trivial: to find relators completing the public presentation \( \hat{H} \) to a presentation \( H \) isomorphic to \( G \) by way of the public isomorphism \( , \) and then find \( ^{-1} \).

Moreover, as a map on the generators of \( G \) may not induce an onto homomorphism from \( G \) to \( \hat{H} \), and this will deprive the adversary even from the “brute force” attack by looking for a map on the generators of \( \hat{H} \) such that \( : \hat{H} \rightarrow G \) is a homomorphism, and \( ( ) \) is identical on \( G \). If, say, in this example above we discard the relator \( x_1 x_5^{-1} x_3 \) from the final presentation \( H \), then \( x_4 \) will not be in the subgroup of \( \hat{H} \) generated by \( (x_1) \) and therefore there cannot possibly be a \( : \hat{H} \rightarrow G \) such that \( ( ) \) is identical on \( G \).

We now describe a homomorphic public key encryption scheme a little more formally.

: Key Generation: Let \( : G \rightarrow H \) be an isomorphism. Alice’s public key then consists of \( \) as well as presentations \( G \) and \( \hat{H} \), where \( \hat{H} \) is obtained from \( H \) by keeping all of the generators but discarding some of the relators. Alice’s private key consists of \( ^{-1} \) and \( H \).

: Encrypt: Bob’s plaintext is \( g \in G \). To encrypt, he selects an arbitrary word \( w_g \) in the generators of \( G \) representing the element \( g \) and applies the public isomorphism to \( w_g \) to get \( (w_g) \), which is a word in the generators of \( H \) (or \( \hat{H} \), since \( H \) and \( \hat{H} \) have the same set of generators). He then selects an arbitrary word \( h_g \) in the generators of \( \hat{H} \) representing the same element of \( \hat{H} \) as \( (w_g) \) does, and this is now his ciphertext: \( h_g = E(g) \).

: Decrypt: To decrypt, Alice applies her private map \( ^{-1} \) to \( h_g \) to get a word \( w_g' = ^{-1}(h_g) \). This word \( w_g' \) represents the same element of \( G \) as \( w_g \) does because \( ^{-1}(h_g) = ^{-1}( (w_g) ) = w_g \) in the group \( G \) since both \( ^{-1} \) are homomorphisms, and the composition of \( \) and \( ^{-1} \) is the identity map on the group \( G \).

In the following example, we use the presentations
Let the plaintext be the element \( g \in G \) represented by the word \( x_1 x_2 \). Then \( (x_1 x_2) = x_5 x_2 \). Then the word \( x_5 x_2 \) is randomized in \( \hat{H} \) by using relators of \( \hat{H} \) as well as “trivial” relators \( x_i x_1 x_i^{-1} = 1 \) and \( x_i^{-1} x_1 = 1 \). For example: multiply \( x_5 x_2 \) by \( x_4 x_4^{-1} \) to get \( x_4 x_4^{-1} x_5 x_2 \). Then replace \( x_4 \) by \( x_2^5 \), according to one of the relators of \( \hat{H} \), and get \( x_2^5 x_4^{-1} x_5 x_2 \). Now insert \( x_6 x_6^{-1} \) between \( x_5 \) and \( x_2 \) to get \( x_2^5 x_4^{-1} x_5 x_6 x_6^{-1} x_2 \), and then replace \( x_6 \) by \( x_4 x_2 \) to get \( x_2^5 x_4^{-1} x_5 x_4 x_2 x_6^{-1} x_2 \), which can be used as the encryption \( E(g) \).

Finally, we note that automorphisms, instead of general isomorphisms, were used in [?] and [?] to build public key cryptographic primitives employing the same general idea of building an automorphism as a composition of elementary ones. In [?], those were automorphisms of a polynomial algebra, while in [?] automorphisms of a tropical algebra were used along the same lines. We also note that “elementary isomorphisms” (i.e., Tietze transformations) are universal in nature and can be adapted to most any algebraic structure, see e.g. [?], [?], and [?].

9. Semidirect product of groups and more peculiar computational assumptions

Using a semidirect product of (semi)groups as the platform for a very simple key exchange protocol (inspired by the Diffie-Hellman protocol) yields new and sometimes rather peculiar computational assumptions. The exposition in this section follows [?] (see also [?]).

First we recall the definition of a semidirect product:

**Definition 1.** Let \( G, H \) be two groups, let \( \text{Aut}(G) \) be the group of automorphisms of \( G \), and let \( \phi : H \rightarrow \text{Aut}(G) \) be a homomorphism. Then the semidirect product of \( G \) and \( H \) is the set

\[
\Gamma = G \rtimes_p H = \{(g, h) : g \in G, h \in H\}
\]

with the group operation given by

\[
(g, h)(g', h') = (g^\phi(h'), g, h \cdot h').
\]

Here \( g^\phi(h') \) denotes the image of \( g \) under the automorphism \( (h') \), and when we write a product \( h \cdot h' \) of two morphisms, this means that \( h \) is applied first.

In this section, we focus on a special case of this construction, where the group \( H \) is just a subgroup of the group \( \text{Aut}(G) \). If \( H = \text{Aut}(G) \), then the corresponding semidirect product is called the holomorph of the group \( G \). Thus, the holomorph of \( G \), usually denoted by \( \text{Hol}(G) \), is the set of all pairs \( (g, \cdot) \), where \( g \in G, \cdot \in \text{Aut}(G) \), with the group operation given by \( (g, \cdot)(g', \cdot') = (\cdot(g \cdot g'), \cdot') \).

It is often more practical to use a subgroup of \( \text{Aut}(G) \) in this construction, and this is exactly what we do below, where we describe a key exchange protocol that uses (as the platform) an extension of a group \( G \) by a cyclic group of automorphisms.
One can also use this construction if $G$ is not necessarily a group, but just a semigroup, and/or consider endomorphisms of $G$, not necessarily automorphisms. Then the result will be a semigroup.

Thus, let $G$ be a (semi)group. An element $g \in G$ is chosen and made public as well as an arbitrary automorphism $\in Aut(G)$ (or an arbitrary endomorphism $\in End(G)$). Bob chooses a private $n \in \mathbb{N}$, while Alice chooses a private $m \in \mathbb{N}$. Both Alice and Bob are going to work with elements of the form $(g, r)$, where $g \in G$, $r \in \mathbb{N}$. Note that two elements of this form are multiplied as follows: $(g, r) \cdot (h, s) = (\cdot^r(g) \cdot h, r+s)$.

The following is a public key exchange protocol between Alice and Bob.

1. Alice computes $(g, )^m = (m^{-1}(g) \cdots 2(g) \cdot (g) \cdot g, m)$ and sends only the first component of this pair to Bob. Thus, she sends to Bob only the element $a = m^{-1}(g) \cdots 2(g) \cdot (g) \cdot g$ of the (semi)group $G$.

2. Bob computes $(g, )^n = (n^{-1}(g) \cdots 2(g) \cdot (g) \cdot g, n)$ and sends only the first component of this pair to Alice. Thus, he sends to Alice only the element $b = n^{-1}(g) \cdots 2(g) \cdot (g) \cdot g$ of the (semi)group $G$.

3. Alice computes $(b, x) \cdot (a, m) = (m(b) \cdot a, x \cdot m)$. Her key is now $K_A = m(b) \cdot a$. Note that she does not actually “compute” $x \cdot m$ because she does not know the automorphism $x = n$; recall that it was not transmitted to her. But she does not need it to compute $K_A$.

4. Bob computes $(a, y) \cdot (b, n) = (n(a) \cdot b, y \cdot n)$. His key is now $K_B = n(a) \cdot b$. Again, Bob does not actually “compute” $y \cdot n$ because he does not know the automorphism $y = m$.

5. Since $(b, x) \cdot (a, m) = (a, y) \cdot (b, n) = (g, )^{m+n}$, we should have $K_A = K_B = K$, the shared secret key.

Remark 1. Note that, in contrast with the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange, correctness here is based on the equality $h^m \cdot h^n = h^n \cdot h^m = h^{m+n}$ rather than on the equality $(h^m)^n = (h^n)^m = h^{mn}$. In the original Diffie-Hellman set up, our trick would not work because, if the shared key $K$ was just the product of two openly transmitted elements, then anybody, including the eavesdropper, could compute $K$.

We note that the general protocol above can be used with any non-commutative group $G$ if is selected to be a non-trivial inner automorphism, i.e., conjugation by an element which is not in the center of $G$. Furthermore, it can be used with any non-commutative semigroup $G$ as well, as long as $G$ has some invertible elements; these can be used to produce inner automorphisms. A typical example of such a semigroup would be a semigroup of matrices over some ring.

Now let $G$ be a non-commutative (semi)group and let $h \in G$ be an invertible non-central element. Then conjugation by $h$ is a non-identical inner automorphism of $G$ that we denote by $h$. We use an extension of the semigroup $G$ by the inner automorphism $h$, as described in the beginning of this section. For any element $g \in G$ and for any integer $k \geq 1$, we have
\[ h(g) = g^{-1}gh; \quad k(g) = h^{-k}gh^k. \]

Now our general protocol is specialized in this case as follows.

(1) Alice and Bob agree on a (semi)group \( G \) and on public elements \( g, h \in G \), where \( h \) is an invertible non-central element.

(2) Alice selects a private positive integer \( m \), and Bob selects a private positive integer \( n \).

(3) Alice computes \( (g, h)^m = (h^{-m+1}gh^{m-1} \cdots h^{-2}gh^2 \cdot h^{-1}gh \cdot g, h) \) and sends only the first component of this pair to Bob. Thus, she sends to Bob only the element

\[ A = h^{-m+1}gh^{m-1} \cdots h^{-2}gh^2 \cdot h^{-1}gh \cdot g = h^{-m}(hg)^m. \]

(4) Bob computes \( (g, h)^n = (h^{-n+1}gh^{n-1} \cdots h^{-2}gh^2 \cdot h^{-1}gh \cdot g, n) \) and sends only the first component of this pair to Alice. Thus, he sends to Alice only the element

\[ B = h^{-n+1}gh^{n-1} \cdots h^{-2}gh^2 \cdot h^{-1}gh \cdot g = h^{-n}(hg)^n. \]

(5) Alice computes \( (B, x) \cdot (A, m) = (m(B) \cdot A, x \cdot m) \). Her key is now

\[ K_{Alice} = m(B) \cdot A = h^{-(m+n)}(hg)^{m+n}. \]

Note that she does not actually “compute” \( x \cdot m \) because she does not know the automorphism \( x = n \); recall that it was not transmitted to her. But she does not need it to compute \( K_{Alice} \).

(6) Bob computes \( (A, y) \cdot (B, n) = (n(A) \cdot B, y \cdot n) \). His key is now \( K_{Bob} = n(A) \cdot B \). Again, Bob does not actually “compute” \( y \cdot n \) because he does not know the automorphism \( y = m \).

(7) Since \( (B, x) \cdot (A, m) = (A, y) \cdot (B, n) = (M, h)^{m+n} \), we should have

\[ K_{Alice} = K_{Bob} = K, \] the shared secret key.

Thus, the shared secret key in this protocol is

\[ K = m(B) \cdot A = n(A) \cdot B = h^{-(m+n)}(hg)^{m+n}. \]

Therefore, our security assumption here is that it is computationally hard to retrieve the key \( K = h^{-(m+n)}(hg)^{m+n} \) from the quadruple \( (h, g, h^{-m}(hg)^m, h^{-n}(hg)^n) \). In particular, we have to take care that the elements \( h \) and \( hg \) do not commute because otherwise, \( K \) is just a product of \( h^{-m}(hg)^m \) and \( h^{-n}(hg)^n \). Once again, the problem is:

Given a (semi)group \( G \) and elements \( g, h, h^{-m}(hg)^m, h^{-n}(hg)^n \) of \( G \), find \( h^{-(m+n)}(hg)^{m+n} \).

Compare this to the Diffie-Hellman problem from Section ??:

Given a (semi)group \( G \) and elements \( g, g^n, \) and \( g^m \) of \( G \), find \( g^{mn} \).
A weaker security assumption arises if an eavesdropper tries to recover a private exponent from a transmission, i.e., to recover, say, \( m \) from \( h^{-m}(hg)^m \). A special case of this problem, where \( h = 1 \), is the “discrete log” problem, namely: recover \( m \) from \( g \) and \( g^m \). However, the “discrete log” problem is a problem on cyclic, in particular abelian, groups, whereas in the former problem it is essential that \( g \) and \( h \) do not commute.

By varying the automorphism (or endomorphism) used for an extension of \( G \), one can get many other security assumptions. However, many (semi)groups \( G \) just do not have outer (i.e., non-inner) automorphisms, so there is no guarantee that a selected platform (semi)group will have any outer automorphisms. On the other hand, it will have inner automorphisms as long as it has invertible non-central elements.

In conclusion, we note that there is always a concern (as well as in the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol) about the orders of public elements (in our case, about the orders of \( h \) and \( hg \)): if one of the orders is too small, then a brute force attack may be feasible.

If a group of matrices of small size is chosen as the platform, then the above protocol turns out to be vulnerable to a “linear algebra attack”, similar to an attack on Stickel’s protocol \([?]\) offered in \([?]\), albeit more sophisticated, see \([?], [?], [?]\). A composition of conjugating automorphism with a field automorphism was employed in \([?]\), but this automorphism still turned out to be not complex enough to make the protocol withstand a linear algebra attack, see \([?], [?]\). Selecting a good platform (semi)group for the protocol in this section still remains an open problem.

Finally, we mention another, rather different, proposal \([?]\) of a cryptosystem based on the semidirect product of two groups and yet another, more complex, proposal of a key agreement based on the semidirect product of two monoids \([?]\).

10. THE SUBSET SUM AND THE KNAPSACK PROBLEMS

As usual, elements of a group \( G \) are given as words in the alphabet \( X \cup X^{-1} \). We begin with three decision problems:

**The subset sum problem (SSP):** Given \( g_1, \ldots, g_k, g \in G \) decide if

\[
g = g_1^{e_1} \cdots g_k^{e_k}
\]

for some \( 1, \ldots, k \in \{0, 1\} \).

**The knapsack problem (KP):** Given \( g_1, \ldots, g_k, g \in G \) decide if

\[
g = g_1^{e_1} \cdots g_k^{e_k}
\]

for some non-negative integers \( 1, \ldots, k \).

The third problem is equivalent to KP in the abelian case, but in general this is a completely different problem:

**The Submonoid membership problem (SMP):** Given elements \( g_1, \ldots, g_k, g \in G \) decide if \( g \) belongs to the submonoid generated by \( g_1, \ldots, g_k \) in \( G \), i.e., if the following equality holds for some \( g_{i_1}, \ldots, g_{i_s} \in \{g_1, \ldots, g_k\}, s \in \mathbb{N}: \)

\[
g = g_{i_1} \cdots g_{i_s}.
\]
The restriction of **SMP** to the case where the set of generators \( \{ g_1, \ldots, g_n \} \) is closed under inversion (so that the submonoid is actually a subgroup of \( G \)) is a well-known **subgroup membership problem**, one of the most basic algorithmic problems in group theory.

There are also natural **search** versions of the decision problems above, where the goal is to find a particular solution to the equations (??), (??), or (??), provided that solutions do exist.

We also mention, in passing, an interesting research avenue explored in [?]: many search problems can be converted to **optimization** problems asking for an “optimal” (usually meaning “minimal”) solution of the corresponding search problem. A well-known example of an optimization problems is the **geodesic problem**: given a word in the generators of a group \( G \), find a word of minimum length representing the same element of \( G \).

The classical (i.e., not group-theoretical) subset sum problem is one of the very basic **NP**-complete problems, so there is extensive related bibliography (see [?]). The **SSP** problem attracted a lot of extra attention when Merkle and Hellmann designed a public key cryptosystem [?] based on a variation of **SSP**. That cryptosystem was broken by Shamir in [?], but the interest persists and the ideas survive in numerous new cryptosystems and their variations (see e.g. [?]). Generalizations of knapsack-type cryptosystems to non-commutative groups seem quite promising from the viewpoint of post-quantum cryptography, although relevant cryptographic schemes are yet to be built.

In [?], the authors showed, in particular, that **SSP** is **NP**-complete in: (1) the direct sum of countably many copies of the infinite cyclic group \( \mathbb{Z} \); (2) free metabelian non-abelian groups of finite rank; (3) wreath product of two finitely generated infinite abelian groups; (4) Thompson’s group \( F \); (5) Baumslag–Solitar group \( BS(m,n) \) for \(|m| \neq |n|\), and in many other groups.

In [?], the authors showed that the subset sum problem is polynomial time decidable in every finitely generated virtually nilpotent group but there exists a polycyclic group where this problem is NP-complete. Later in [?], Nikolaev and Ushakov showed that, in fact, every polycyclic non-virtually-nilpotent group has NP-complete subset sum problem.

Also in [?], it was shown that the knapsack problem is undecidable in a direct product of sufficiently many copies of the discrete Heisenberg group (which is nilpotent of class 2). However, for the discrete Heisenberg group itself, the knapsack problem is decidable. Thus, decidability of the knapsack problem is not preserved under direct products. In [?], the effect of free and direct products on the time complexity of the knapsack and related problems was studied further.

### 11. The Post Correspondence Problem

The Post correspondence problem **PCP**(\( \mathcal{A} \)) for a semigroup (or any other algebraic structure) \( \mathcal{A} \) is to decide, given two n-tuples \( u = (u_1, \ldots, u_n) \) and \( v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n) \) of elements of \( \mathcal{A} \), if there is a term (called a **solution**) \( t(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) in the language of \( \mathcal{A} \) such that \( t(u_1, \ldots, u_n) = t(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \) in \( \mathcal{A} \). In 1946 Post introduced
this problem in the case of free monoids (free semigroups) and proved that it is undecidable [?]. (See [?] for a simpler proof.)

The PCP in groups is closely related to the problem of finding the equalizer $E(\ ,\ )$ of two group homomorphisms $\ : H \to G$. The equalizer is defined as $E(\ ,\ ) = \{w \in H \mid (w) = (w)\}$. Specifically, PCP in a group $G$ is the same as to decide if the equalizer of a given pair of homomorphisms $\in \text{Hom}(H, G)$, where $H$ is a free group of finite rank in the variety $\text{Var}(G)$ generated by $G$, is trivial or not. Indeed, in this case every tuple $u = (u_1,\ldots,u_n)$ of elements of $G$ corresponds to a homomorphism $u$ from a free group $H$ with a basis $x_1,\ldots,x_n$ in the variety $\text{Var}(G)$ such that $u(x_1) = u_1,\ldots,u(x_n) = u_n$. The equalizer $E(\ u,\ v)$ describes all solutions $w$ for the instance $(u, v)$.

There is an interesting variation of the Post correspondence problem for semigroups and groups that we call a non-homogeneous Post correspondence problem, or a general Post correspondence problem GPCP, following [?): given two tuples $u$ and $v$ of elements in a (semi)group $S$ as above and two extra elements $a, b \in S$, decide if there is a term $t(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$ such that $at(u_1,\ldots,u_n) = bt(v_1,\ldots,v_n)$ in $S$. Interesting connections between GPCP and the (double) twisted conjugacy problem were reported in [?]. Specifically, it was shown in [?] that the double endomorphism twisted conjugacy problem in a relatively free group in $\text{Var}(G)$ is equivalent to GPCP$(G)$, and, in general, the double endomorphism twisted conjugacy problem in $G$ is P-time reducible to GPCP$(G)$.

Another interesting observation made in [?] is that if GPCP is decidable in a group $G$ then there is a uniform algorithm to solve the word problem in every finitely presented (relative to $G$) quotient of $G$. Furthermore, since decidability of GPCP in $G$ is inherited by all subgroups of $G$, decidability of GPCP in $G$ implies the uniform decidability of the word problem in every finitely presented quotient of every subgroup of $G$.

Examples of groups with undecidable GPCP include free groups and free solvable groups of derived length at least 3 and sufficiently high rank ([?]). On the other hand, examples of groups where GPCP is decidable in polynomial time include all finitely generated nilpotent groups.

Furthermore, it was shown in [?] that in a free group, the bounded GPCP is NP-complete. (In the bounded version of GPCP one is looking only for solutions (i.e., the words $t(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$), whose length is bounded by a given number.)

The search version of the Post correspondence problem (or of the bounded version thereof) is to find a solution for a given instance, provided at least one solution exists. As usual, search versions can potentially be used to build cryptographic primitives, although it is not immediately clear how to convert the search version of the (bounded or not) Post correspondence problem to a one-way function with trapdoor.

### 12. The Hidden Subgroup Problem

Given a group $G$, a subgroup $H \leq G$, and a set $X$, we say that a function $f : G \to X$ hides the subgroup $H$ if for all $g_1, g_2 \in G$, one has $f(g_1) = f(g_2)$ if and only
if \( g_1H = g_2H \) for the cosets of \( H \). Equivalently, the function \( f \) is constant on the cosets of \( H \), while it is different between the different cosets of \( H \).

The hidden subgroup problem (HSP) is:

Let \( G \) be a finite group, \( X \) a finite set, and \( f : G \rightarrow X \) a function that hides a subgroup \( H \leq G \). The function \( f \) is given via an oracle, which uses \( O(\log |G| + \log |X|) \) bits. Using information gained from evaluations of \( f \) via its oracle, determine a generating set for \( H \).

A special case is where \( X \) is a group and \( f \) is a group homomorphism, in which case \( H \) corresponds to the kernel of \( f \).

The importance of the hidden subgroup problem is due to the facts that:

- Shor’s polynomial time quantum algorithm for factoring and discrete logarithm problem (as well as several of its extensions) relies on the ability of quantum computers to solve the HSP for finite abelian groups. Both factoring and discrete logarithm problem are of paramount importance for modern commercial cryptography.
- The existence of efficient quantum algorithms for HSP for certain non-abelian groups would imply efficient quantum algorithms for two major problems: the graph isomorphism problem and certain shortest vector problems in lattices. More specifically, an efficient quantum algorithm for the HSP for the symmetric group would give a quantum algorithm for the graph isomorphism, whereas an efficient quantum algorithm for the HSP for the dihedral group would give a quantum algorithm for the shortest vector problem.

We refer to [?] for a brief discussion on how the HSP can be generalized to infinite groups.

13. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOME OF THE PROBLEMS

In this section, we discuss relations between some of the problems described earlier in this chapter. In the preceding Sections ?? and ?? we have already pointed out some of the relations, now here are some other relations, through the prism of cryptographic applications.

We start with the conjugacy search problem (CSP), which was the subject of Section ??, and one of its ramifications, the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem:

Given two elements \( w, h \) of a group \( G \), a subgroup \( A \leq G \), and the information that \( w^a = h \) for some \( a \in A \), find at least one particular element \( a \) like that.

In reference to the Ko-Lee protocol described in Section ??, one of the parties (Alice) transmits \( w^a \) for some private \( a \in A \), and the other party (Bob) transmits \( w^b \) for some private \( b \in B \), where the subgroups \( A \) and \( B \) commute elementwise, i.e., \( ab = ba \) for any \( a \in A, b \in B \).
Now suppose the adversary finds \(a_1, a_2 \in A\) such that \(a_1w = a'w\) and \(b_1, b_2 \in B\) such that \(b_1w = b'w\). Then the adversary gets

\[
a_1b_1w = a_1b_1w = b_1^{-1}a_1w = b_1^{-1}a_2w = b_1^{-1}a_1wab = K,
\]

the shared secret key.

We emphasize that these \(a_1, a_2\) and \(b_1, b_2\) do not have anything to do with the private elements originally selected by Alice or Bob, which simplifies the search substantially. We also point out that, in fact, it is sufficient for the adversary to find just one pair, say, \(a_1, a_2 \in A\), to get the shared secret key:

\[
a_1(b^{-1}w)a_2 = b^{-1}a_1wa_2b = b^{-1}a^{-1}wab = K.
\]

In summary, to get the secret key \(K\), the adversary does not have to solve the (subgroup-restricted) conjugacy search problem, but instead, it is sufficient to solve an apparently easier (subgroup-restricted) decomposition search problem, see our Section ??.

Then, one more trick reduces the decomposition search problem to a special case where \(w = 1\), i.e., to the factorization problem, see our Section ??.

Thus, if we denote by \(A^w\) the subgroup conjugate to \(A\) by the (public) element \(w\), the problem for the adversary is now the following factorization search problem:

Given an element \(w'\) of a group \(G\) and two subgroups \(A' \leq A\) and \(B' \leq B\), find any two elements \(a \in A'\) and \(b \in B'\) that satisfy \(a \cdot b = w'\), provided at least one such pair of elements exists.

Since in the original Ko-Lee protocol one has \(A = B\), this yields the following interesting observation: if in that protocol \(A\) is a normal subgroup of \(G\), then \(A^w = A\), and the above problem becomes: given \(w' \in A\), find any two elements \(a_1, a_2 \in A\) such that \(w' = a_1a_2\). This problem is trivial: \(a_1\) here could be any element from \(A\), and then \(a_2 = a_1^{-1}w'\).

Therefore, in choosing the platform group \(G\) and two commuting subgroups for a protocol described in our Section ?? or Section ??, one has to avoid normal subgroups. This means, in particular, that “artificially” introducing commuting subgroups as, say, direct factors is inappropriate from the security point of view.

At the other extreme, there are malnormal subgroups. A subgroup \(A \leq G\) is called malnormal in \(G\) if, for any \(g \in G\), \(A^g \cap A = \{1\}\). We observe that if, in the original Ko-Lee protocol, \(A\) is a malnormal subgroup of \(G\), then the decomposition search problem corresponding to that protocol has a unique solution if \(w \notin A\). Indeed, suppose \(w' = a_1 \cdot w \cdot a_1' = a_2 \cdot w \cdot a_2'\), where \(a_1 \neq a_2\), say. Then \(a_2^{-1}a_1w = wa_2'a_1^{-1}\), hence \(w^{-1}a_2^{-1}a_1w = a_2'a_1^{-1}\). Since \(A\) is malnormal, the element on the left does not belong to \(A\), whereas the one on the right does, a contradiction. This argument shows that, in fact, already if \(A^w \cap A = \{1\}\) for this particular \(w\), then the corresponding decomposition search problem has a unique solution.
Finally, we describe one more trick that reduces, to some extent, the decomposition search problem to the (subgroup-restricted) conjugacy search problem. Suppose we are given $w = a w b$, and we need to recover $a \in A$ and $b \in B$, where $A$ and $B$ are two elementwise commuting subgroups of a group $G$.

Pick any $b_1 \in B$ and compute:

$$[awb, b_1] = b^{-1}w^{-1}a^{-1}b_1^{-1}awbb_1 = b^{-1}w^{-1}b_1^{-1}wbb_1 = (b_1^{-1}w)^a b_1 = ((b_1^{-1}w)b)b_1.$$  

Since we know $b_1$, we can multiply the result by $b_1^{-1}$ on the right to get $w'' = ((b_1^{-1}w)b)$. Now the problem becomes: recover $b \in B$ from the known $w'' = ((b_1^{-1}w)b)$ and $(b_1^{-1}w)$. This is the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem. By solving it, one can recover a $b \in B$.

Similarly, to recover an $a \in A$, one picks any $a_1 \in A$ and computes:

$$[(awb)^{-1}, (a_1)^{-1}] = awba^{-1}a^{-1}a_1^{-1} = awa^{-1}a_1^{-1} = ((a_1)^{w^{-1}}a^{-1}a_1^{-1} = (a_1)^{w^{-1}}a^{-1}a_1^{-1}.$$  

Multiply the result by $a_1$ on the right to get $w'' = ((a_1)^{w^{-1}}a^{-1}a_1^{-1}$, so that the problem becomes: recover $a \in A$ from the known $w'' = ((a_1)^{w^{-1}}a^{-1}a_1^{-1}$ and $(a_1)^{w^{-1}}a^{-1}$.

We have to note that, since a solution of the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem is not always unique, solving the above two instances of this problem may not necessarily give the right solution of the original decomposition problem. However, any two solutions, call them $b'$ and $b''$, of the first conjugacy search problem differ by an element of the centralizer of $(b_1^{-1}w)$, and this centralizer is unlikely to have a non-trivial intersection with $B$.

A similar computation shows that the same trick reduces the factorization search problem, too, to the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem. Suppose we are given $w = ab$, and we need to recover $a \in A$ and $b \in B$, where $A$ and $B$ are two elementwise commuting subgroups of a group $G$. Pick any $b_1 \in B$ and compute

$$[ab, b_1] = b^{-1}a^{-1}b_1^{-1}abb_1 = (b_1^{-1}b)b_1.$$  

Since we know $b_1$, we can multiply the result by $b_1^{-1}$ on the right to get $w'' = (b_1^{-1}b)$. This is the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem. By solving it, one can recover a $b \in B$.

This same trick can, in fact, be used to attack the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem itself. Suppose we are given $w' = a^{-1}wa$, and we need to recover $a \in A$. Pick any $b$ from the centralizer of $A$; typically, there is a public subgroup $B$ that commutes with $A$ elementwise; then just pick any $b \in B$. Then compute

$$[w', b] = [a^{-1}wa, b] = a^{-1}w^{-1}ab^{-1}a^{-1}wab = a^{-1}w^{-1}b^{-1}wab = (b^{-w})^a b.$$  

Multiply the result by $b^{-1}$ on the right to get $(b^{-w})^a$, so the problem now is to recover $a \in A$ from $(b^{-w})^a$ and $b^{-w}$. This problem might be easier than the original problem because there is flexibility in choosing $b \in B$. In particular, a feasible attack might be to choose several different $b \in B$ and try to solve the above conjugacy search problem for each in parallel by using some general method (e.g.,
a length-based attack). Chances are that the attack will be successful for at least one of the $b$’s.

REFERENCES


[75] Licheng Wang, LiHua Wang, Zhenfu Cao, Yixian Yang, and XinXin Niu, Conjugate adjoining problem in braid groups and new design of braid-based signatures, SCIENCE CHINA Information Sciences 53 (2010), 524–536.

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, THE CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, NY 10031

Email address: shpil@groups.sci.ccny.cuny.edu